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THE U.S. – JAPAN ALLIANCE AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN-TAIWAN RELATIONS
The end of the Cold War has brought tremendous changes in the 
international system. In Asia, the most significant change has been 
the rise of China. Faced with China’s rapid economic growth and 
increased military threat, the United States has shifted its strategic 
focus to the Asia-Pacific region, strengthening defense cooperation 
with Japan. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
the United States and Japan was initially a Cold War alliance to 
combat the threat of the Soviet Union. Due to its strategic position, 
Taiwan is a crucial part of the Western Pacific for the United States. 
For Japan, Taiwan is “Japan’s lifeline,” and is a major unspoken 
factor in Japan’s security policy considerations. Does security and 
stability in the Taiwan Strait influence trade and development and 
overall military balance in the wider Asia-Pacific region? This study 
looks at changes in security in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan-Japan 
relations through the evolution of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty. 
Keywords: Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United 
States and Japan, security in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan-Japan relations
Introduction
East Asia has seen dramatic changes over the seventy years from the end of the 
Second World War, through the Cold War and post-Cold War period, involving 
changing patterns of inter-state cooperation or conflict. In the context of these 
changes, the U.S. – Japan relationship has remained relatively stable. However, 
with the rise of China, this relationship has also evolved, primarily through 
several redefinitions of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty. These changes have 
reflected the new position of the United States in East Asia, and have challenged 
Jebat  Volume 42 (1) (July 2015) Page | 57
Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies, Vol. 42 (1) (July 2015): 57-76
@ School of History, Politics & Strategy, UKM; ISSN  2180-0251 (electronic), 0126-5644 (paper)
China’s attempts to expand its regional power. However, these changes have 
also affected relations between Japan and Taiwan. Under the redefined U.S. 
– Japan Security Treaty, the two sides have developed a mutually beneficial 
relationship. This study uses a macro perspective to assess whether the U.S. 
– Japan security system may benefit cross-Strait relations, and whether it can 
provide an additional layer of protection for Taiwan’s security. These two 
important questions are the focus of this study.
Evolution of the U.S. – Japan Security System
It is now more than sixty years since the signing of the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (U.S. – Japan 
Security Treaty) in 1951. Based on economic considerations and the equal 
status of the two powers, as well as national interests and challenges, four 
major reforms to the Treaty have been made: revisions to the Security Treaty 
in 1960, the Guidelines for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978, the 
U.S. – Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century of 
1996, and the New Guidelines for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation of 1997. 
Looking at the birth of the Security Treaty and its four major reforms, each 
change occurred with a specific context closely related to the security situation 
in the Asia-Pacific region. In the section below, we discuss the content of the 
U.S. – Japan Security Treaty in different periods and its relationship to regional 
security. 
1960-1970: U.S. Leadership
The U.S. – Japan Security Treaty was signed in response to the international 
situation of the time. After the Second World War, in order to prevent the 
reemergence of Japanese militarism, the allies wrote Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution renouncing war, maintaining an army, navy, or air force, and the 
right to belligerency. However, with the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. 
policy towards Japan changed. The U.S. now viewed Japan as a base to contain 
the expansion of Communism in Asia.  
The U.S. – Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951. The content 
of the treaty can be interpreted as follows: Japan has disarmed and can no 
longer exercise the right to self-defense. In addition, militarism still persisted 
in Japan, which remained a potential threat. Therefore, Japan signed a security 
treaty with the United States allowing American forces to be stationed in Japan 
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to prevent a military attack against Japan and provide a temporary solution 
for the country’s defense. The treaty provided legal basis for U.S. troops to 
station in Japan. Therefore, aside from preventing the reemergence of Japanese 
militarism, the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty also prevented Communism 
aggression in the Far East threatening regional peace and security. 
However, there were many inequalities in the 1951 U.S. – Japan 
Security Treaty and U.S. – Japan Administrative Agreement, including a lack 
of autonomy on the use of military facilities and armaments, and exclusive 
American use of former imperial Japanese military facilities. Japan was forced 
to pay some of the costs of stationing American forces in the country. In 
addition, American military personnel and their families enjoyed exemption 
from tax and extraterritoriality. Therefore, U.S. – Japan relations under the 
1951 Security Treaty can be viewed as de-facto extension of the American 
occupation. 
Unequal U.S. – Japan relations and anxiety about Japan becoming 
dragged into the Cold War conflict produced opposition in Japan toward the 
Security Treaty. However, then Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida put 
priority on economic reconstruction of the war-torn economy, and advocated 
establishing small self-defense forces, while relying on U.S. military power. 
Yoshida saw that Japan’s postwar economic recovery was slow, and believed 
that the political and economic benefits of the Security Treaty were to be greater 
than military concessions. Therefore, in order to obtain more economic aid and 
technology transfers from the United States, and to enable Japan to pursue 
economic development under American protection and rejoin international 
society, Japan had no option but to accept the conditions set forth by the United 
States.1
However, even though the United States provided military and 
economic assistance, in the 1950s, Japan had only a 75,000 strong police force, 
which in military terms was woefully insufficient for self-defense. In addition, 
the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty contained no contingency mechanism for the 
U.S. military or United Nations in the event that Japan was subject to attack. 
In addition to a lack of clear provisions for mutual assistance, in the event of 
large-scale domestic disturbances, the Japanese government still had to request 
the assistance of the United States, making it impossible to respond quickly to 
critical situations. Therefore, a sense of insecurity in both national defense and 
internal affairs had an adverse effect on Japan’s economic recovery. 
In 1957, during a meeting between U.S. president Dwight D. 
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Eisenhower and Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, both sides agreed 
they should establish new cooperative relations for the new era, and should 
therefore review the then-existing security treaty arrangement. After several 
rounds of negotiation, the new Security Treaty was signed in 1960. The new 
Security Treaty gave Japan a significantly enhanced role as well as greater 
autonomy. 
The new treaty refers to the rights of collective self-defense in Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter as its legal basis. In addition, it covered U.S. 
and Japanese political and economic relations, not limited to military ones. 
Also, U.S. defense zone under the treaty is no longer limited to Japan, and is 
expanded to cover the Far East. 
Overall, Japan’s defense policy in the 1950s under the U.S. – Japan 
Security Treaty followed “exclusive defense” as the basic principle of security. 
Despite not assuming responsibility for regional security, Japan was able to rely 
on U.S. defense commitment. This ensured that Japan’s political and economic 
relations in East Asia would remain undamaged, while also not jeopardizing 
the incumbent domestic ruling elite established through a political consensus 
between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions and the priority given to 
economic development. 2 
Table 1 Comparison between the 1951 and 1960 U.S. – Japan Security 
Treaty
Similarities Differences
1. Based on the principle of protecting 
Japan’s independence and security. 
1. The new treaty stresses that the content 
of the treaty must be consistent  with the 
provision of the UN Charter. Japan had not 
yet entered the UN when the old treaty was 
signed, so the old treaty does not mention UN 
provisions. 
2. The U.S. military as the main agent for 
protecting Japan’s national security.  
2. The new treaty stresses political and 
economic relations, while the old treaty states 
that Japan invites the U.S. to station its troops 
in the country to meet its defense needs. 
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3. Consent is given to the U.S. to uses 
bases and facilities within Japan. 
3. In the new treaty, Japan has the right to fight 
against foreign aggression alongside the U.S.; 
the old treaty only states that the U.S. must 
protect Japan. 
4. By signing the treaty, the U.S. hopes 
that Japan will become a stabilizing force 
in Asia.  
4. The new treaty removes the provision for 
the U.S. military to suppress civil strife in 
Japan. 
5. In the old treaty, the U.S. has full rights to 
carry out military operations.  The new treaty 
gives Japan the right to a say in U.S. military 
operations. 
6. The new treaty clearly stipulates a ten-year 
term. 
7. The new treaty includes provisions for 
maintaining peace and security in the Far East, 
while the defensive scope of the old treaty is 
confined to Japan.  
Source: Shao-hsien Chu. 1970. “U.S. – Japan Security Treaty and Japan’s Defense,” Issues and 
Studies 9, 9: 39-40 (in Chinese).
1970-1990: Regional Cooperation and Mutual Defense
After the signing of the new U.S. – Japan Security Treaty in 1960, Japan 
focused its efforts on national economic development under the U.S. – Japan 
security system. However by the 1970s, changes in the international situation 
had also changed the relationship between the two countries. 
In the late 1960s, newly elected President Richard M. Nixon pointed 
out that the United States spent hundreds of billions of dollars funding the 
Vietnam War, having dissipated American power. At the same time, Soviet 
military power became rapidly stronger, posing a threat to America’s global 
security strategy. Nixon believed that in order to get out of the quagmire in 
the Vietnam War, the rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China was 
necessary. Therefore, after his inauguration, Nixon took steps to improve the 
relationship between the U.S. and Beijing. While he still regarded Beijing 
as a “potential enemy,” he believed that the main threat to American global 
interests came from Moscow rather than Beijing.3
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In July 1969, President Nixon put forth the famous Nixon Doctrine 
during a conference in Guam. The doctrine clearly stated that the United States 
would concentrate its forces in Europe and the Middle East to resist Soviet 
military power, and carry out a strategic withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific 
region. As a result, Japan and other allies in the Asia-Pacific region were asked 
to take more responsibility for their own defense. In the future, U.S. foreign 
policy, whether it is in Asia or elsewhere, would involve less intervention.
In addition, the worsening Sino-Soviet conflict made Beijing realize 
that the Soviet Union rather than the United States posed greater threat to its 
national security. Therefore, adopting a friendlier stance toward the United 
States would allow China to focus its efforts against the Soviet threat, while 
also guarding against the risk of the United States allying with the Soviet 
Union against China. Faced with the threat of Soviet hegemons, China pursued 
active cooperation with the United States and Japan through the Shanghai 
Communiqué of 1972 and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan .  
The most obvious change in U.S. – Japan relations in the 1970s was 
the signing of the bilateral Guidelines for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation 
in 1978 based on the principle that Japan would only use its military to defend 
its territory. The Guidelines stated that should Japan come under attack, the 
two countries should jointly take effective action. In peacetime, the two sides 
should work together and ensure required defense postures in the areas of 
operations, intelligence, and logistical support. In the case of a contingency 
in  the Far East that affects  Japan’s security, Japan should provide relevant 
assistance for the activities of U.S. forces based on the U.S. – Japan Security 
Treaty.4
The U.S. – Japan Security Treaty and the 1978 Guidelines for U.S. – 
Japan Defense Cooperation were the basis of the comprehensive U.S. – Japan 
security treaty system, serving as the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Before the end of the Cold War, Soviet expansion 
was jointly checked  by the United States, Japan, and China. The bilateral 
system therefore reached the level of regional cooperation, and was crucial to 
maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia as well as elevating Japan’s 
international status. 
1990s: Deepening Cooperation, Shared Responsibility for Security and 
Defense in the Asia-Pacific
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War pattern of U.S.-Soviet 
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conflict came to an end. However, in the post-Cold War period, the U.S. security 
strategy in the Asia-Pacific  still centered on the U.S. – Japan security system. 
Former U.S. president George H. W. Bush stressed the importance of U.S. – 
Japanese military cooperation, asking Japan to share responsibility for security 
and defense in the Asia-Pacific region, and stressing bilateral cooperation and 
exchanges of military technology. 
In 1989, President Bush issued a joint statement in Washington 
affirming the importance of the U.S. – Japan Security System to peace in the 
Asia-Pacific, and stating that the United States and Japan would be engaged 
in close security cooperation to secure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific.5
In 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker described the strategic 
security relations between the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific as 
a hub and spokes structure, with the U.S. – Japan security alliance as the center 
fold in bilateral relations between the United States and its regional allies.6 
This was the famous ”fan-spread theory” of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific 
region centered on the U.S. – Japan security relationship. The strategic forward 
deployment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific was based on the U.S. – Japan 
security alliance. 
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the “United 
States Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region.” This report 
stressed the importance of U.S. – Japan relations as the basis for Asia-Pacific 
security and the global strategy of the United States.1 In the same year, Japan 
also published a revised “National Defense Program Outline.” Aside from 
expressing a willingness to strengthen cooperation with the United States, it 
also conformed to the “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific 
Region,” confirming the importance of the U.S. – Japan security system. 
In 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. 
President Bill Clinton agreed to re-examine the 1978 Guidelines for U.S. 
– Japan Defense Cooperation. After more than a year of coordination and 
consultation, in 1997 the two sides signed new Guidelines for U.S. – Japan 
Defense Cooperation. The new Guidelines stressed military cooperation 
between the two sides under ordinary circumstances, as well as maintain 
the security of the Asia-Pacific region surrounding Japan. The agreement 
also stressed political and economic cooperation, as well as global security 
cooperation, primarily as a defense against China and North Korea. 
1  United Stated Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1995).
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In addition, the new Guidelines, were based on joint U.S. – Japan 
military action in response to “situations in areas surrounding Japan” that have 
an important influence on Japan’s security, rather than the “Far East” as the 
geographically defined scope of cooperation.7
During the Cold War, the U.S. – Japan security system was a part 
of the U.S. global containment strategy. After the end of the Cold War, the 
security system became an important mechanism for the United States to 
maintain regional security. The role of Japan under the new security system 
evolved from providing bases to the U.S. military for forward deployment 
to providing logistical support for U.S. military action. After the signing of 
the new Guidelines in 1997, the U.S. – Japan security system has become 
a basis for the expansion of Japan’s role and scope of activities in the Asia-
Pacific region, naturally causing discontent in China as the other major power 
in Northeast Asia.
After 2000: U.S.–Japan Mutual Defense
The two countries gained more space to develop security cooperation after 
the 9.11 terrorist attack of 2001. Japan was now able to relax domestic legal 
restrictions on its military, and provide various types of support to the United 
States in its War on Terror. In 2005, the two countries convened the U.S. – 
Japan Security Consultative Committee, which set the future direction for the 
alliance. As a result, the U.S. – Japan security relationship increasingly became 
to have a mechanism for extra-regional security cooperation outside of the Far 
East that the bilateral security treaty assumed. 
In 2001, Junichiro Koizumi made his first visit to the United States 
after taking office. Koizumi’s foreign policy reflected a mentality of “leaving 
Asia for America,” and constantly reiterated the importance of the U.S. – 
Japan alliance for Japan’s national security. Koizumi also argued that it was 
necessary to first ensure a good relationship with the United States in order to 
placate relations with other countries. On the American side, President George 
W. Bush constantly reiterated the importance of bilateral relations between the 
United States and Japan, while describing Japan as “the United States’ most 
important ally in the Asia-Pacific.” In this meeting of leaders, both the United 
States and Japan emphasized the importance of the other side in their own 
security policy8
In 2001, the Japanese Diet passed three special legal measures with 
a two-year validity: the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, amendments to 
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the Japan Maritime Safety Agency Establishment Law, and amendments to 
the Self-Defense Forces Law. These three laws provided the legal basis for the 
deployment of the self-defense forces overseas in times of war. However, the 
text clearly states that parliamentary approval was required to dispatch troops 
overseas. After the passage of these three laws, Japan immediately dispatched 
naval vessels to the Indian Ocean providing logistical support to American 
forces in their fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The 
scope of cooperation between the United States and Japan therefore expanded 
from the areas surrounding Japan to the Indian Ocean. Therefore, aside 
from providing a legal basis for the actions of the Self-Defense Forces, the 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law also allowed Japan’s military to expand 
the scope of its activities.9
In Japan’s Self-Defense White Paper of 2002, it is not difficult to 
find evidence of the influence of the United States in the development of 
Japanese security policy. In particular, with the increasingly serious North 
Korean situation and the continuing rise of Chinese power, ensuring that the 
United States remains engaged in the region and maintaining the effective 
operation of the U.S. – Japan security system will have an enormous impact on 
Japan’s future security. Therefore, enhancing the U.S. – Japan security system 
and establishing specific cooperation mechanisms is not only about Japan’s 
national security, but also involves future regional stability. Furthermore, the 
White Paper also sets out policy for elevating the Japanese Defense Agency to 
a full cabinet-level ministry, gradually moving towards the goal of normalizing 
Japan’s position in the international system.10 
To support the U.S.-led War on Terror, in 2003 the Diet passed the 
Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in 
a Situation of Armed Attack, amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Act, and 
amendments to the Establishment of the Security Council Act, establishing the 
basic principles and postures adopted by Japan in the event of an attack against 
the country, and ensuring the Self-Defense Forces are able to take necessary 
timely response measures. These reforms created a crisis management 
mechanism as well as legal basis for providing military support for U.S. 
military operation. 
Therefore, it is clear that the development of Japan’s security policy 
has gradually overcome the previous strict restrictions, and allowed for 
strengthened military cooperation with the United States. The strengthened 
mechanisms for bilateral security cooperation have further enhanced the 
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functions of the alliance between the two countries. Cooperation between the 
two countries has focused on crucial areas such as the exchange of intelligence, 
policy coordination and communication, joint military training, and increased 
exchange in military equipment and technology.11
The U.S. – Japan Security System and China-Japan Relations 
China-Japan Relations during the Cold War Period
Traditionally, due to the deep influence of the international environment 
and domestic political factors, Japanese foreign policy has tended to adopt a 
cautious, passive, and pragmatic attitude. During the Cold War, this attitude 
was particularly apparent. With the emergence of the Cold War bipolar system, 
Japan followed the lead of the U.S. both politically and militarily in the struggle 
against the Soviet-led communist camp. This established the position of Japan 
as an important part of the strategy to contain China and other communist 
countries. 
In the late 1960s, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, prompting China 
and the United States to reconcile their differences. As the international situation 
changed, Japan also sought to improve relations with China. According to 
Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, aside from the U.S. – Japan security 
system, Japan also needed friendly relations with China. 
In 1978, Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda signed the Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China 
with China, which included an “antihegemony clause” desired by China, while 
also setting aside the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute. In addition, the two 
sides committed to developing bilateral relations on the basis of friendship and 
mutual benefit.12 Therefore, during the Cold War period, Japan’s enemy was 
the Soviet Union rather than communist China. In fact, China was an expedient 
partner in Japan’s fight against the Soviet Union. 
However, with the end of the Cold War, the external conditions of 
Sino-Japanese relations began to change. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
Russian military threat in Northeast Asia diminished, meaning China and 
Japan no longer had a common strategic interest. Faced with the restructuring 
of the political, economic, and security situation in the region, China and Japan 
also began to reconsider their bilateral relations. 
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China-Japan Relations during the Post-Cold War Period
After the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations remained essentially good. 
However, between 1995 and 1996, China conducted three missile tests in the 
Taiwan Strait, threatening Taiwan militarily. In 1996, the United States and 
Japan published the U.S. – Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for 
the 21st Century. After the United States and Japan signed the new Guidelines 
for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation, Sino-Japanese relations began to 
undergo subtle changes.  
Less than a month after the end of the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, 
the United States and Japan began to discuss revisions to the Guidelines for 
U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation, and in 1996 the two sides published the 
U.S. – Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century. The 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon after issued a statement stating that 
China was willing to strengthen cooperation with Japan and the United States 
on the basis of peaceful cooperation in order to facilitate peace in the region 
and the world. China warned that the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty should not 
exceed its bilateral scope, otherwise it would produce complications in the 
region. In addition, the statement emphasized that Taiwan issue was China’s 
internal affair, and opposed any country interfering in China’s internal affairs.13
In 1997 the United States and Japan signed new Guidelines for U.S. – 
Japan Defense Cooperation. In response to these new Guidelines, the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that U.S. – Japan security cooperation is a 
bilateral arrangement formed under a specific historical context, and that this 
arrangement should be strictly limited to a bilateral scope in order not to cause 
anxiety to neighboring countries in Asia or complicate the regional situation.14 
China also argued that the Guidelines for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation 
clearly exceeded the framework set out in the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty. The 
role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces had expanded significantly, and there 
was an attempt to include Taiwan within the scope of defense cooperation. 
In addition, defining the scope of defense as situations in areas surrounding 
Japan”was a matter of concern to Beijing as it posed a greater threat than a 
geographical definition.  
In the 21st century, China has enjoyed rising military and trading 
power, altering the Cold War power structure in the Asia-Pacific region, and 
even leading to the emergence of the “China threat” thesis. Therefore, in the 
post-Cold War period, aside from competing with the United States in trade, 
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militarily Japan and the United States have developed a closer and more equal 
military alliance, and have established the U.S. – Japan military alliance as a 
major pillar for regional security. However, from a broader perspective, issues 
such as China’s massive market, security on the Korean peninsula, and Japan’s 
attempts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council all require the support of China. Therefore, Japan must also carefully 
consider the potential issues created by the U.S. – Japan alliance. 
When dealing with Northeast Asian security affairs, although Japan’s 
basic position remains the military alliance with the United States, politically 
speaking Japan has tried to use diplomatic and economic means to achieve 
friendly relations with Beijing. 
In terms of U.S. – Japan relations, China is still most concerned about 
the Taiwan issue, and has even requested that Japan explicitly state that the 
U.S. – Japan security system does not include Taiwan. However, Japan has 
continued to pursue policy of ambiguity within the scope of the U.S. – Japan 
security system, since an acknowledgement that the U.S. – Japan security 
system excludes Taiwan may mislead China, encouraging it to use force 
to resolve the Taiwan issue. Japan is not willing to see the emergence of a 
powerful and unified China on its doorstep. 
Taiwan-Japan Interactions and Security in the Taiwan Strait under the 
U.S. – Japan Security System
Taiwan’s democratization is consistent with American political values, and is 
therefore key to strengthening the U.S. security commitment in the Taiwan 
Strait. As a result, the United States and Japan have used their strategic alliance 
to intervene in the Taiwan Strait in order to maintain “peace and security.” 
However, China is also not willing to sit back and watch itself be surrounded 
by the United States and Japan, and has warned Japan not to become involved 
in the Taiwan issue. Therefore, whether the U.S. – Japan security system to be 
extended to include Taiwan will have an important strategic effect in the Asia-
Pacific region, subject to the influence of the mutual interaction between the 
United States, China, and Taiwan. 
Unlike the NATO region, the Asia-Pacific lacks a system of collective 
security. Furthermore, Taiwan is also not a member of the United Nations. 
Therefore, in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. – Japan security 
system is the only mechanism that can provide a timely solution. During the 
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1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States dispatched two aircraft carriers 
to waters near Taiwan. This sent a powerful message both to Beijing and also 
to American regional allies that the United States would keep its promise to 
maintain regional peace and stability. The United States maintained its “one 
China” policy, but also stated that the cross-Strait issue should be resolved 
using peaceful means. 
Therefore, there were no structural changes in U.S. security policy 
in the Asia Pacific after the end of the Cold War. The policy was still centered 
on strengthening bilateral relations between the United States and its regional 
allies, and in particular the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty, using U.S. – Japanese 
cooperation to balance Chinese power in the region. The United States believes 
that a strong Japan that works together with the United States is important for 
the new balance of power in the region. A militarily weak Japan will only 
benefit China.15
The U.S. forces in Japan together with the U.S. – Japan relationship 
provide the foundation of U.S. defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region. China 
has always regarded the U.S. – Japan alliance as a means to dominate Asia 
and limit its own influence in the region. China regarded the 1997 revisions to 
the Guidelines for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation, as an attempt to contain 
China and protect Taiwan. However, for Taiwan, it undoubtedly acts as a 
safeguard to its national security. 
In addition, following the end of the Cold War, faced with China’s 
military expansion and threats, including increasing defense expenditures, 
acquisitions of modern weapons, nuclear weapons tests, and missile tests in 
the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, Japan realized that simply increasing 
defense expenditures would not guarantee its security. In order to protect 
its security and defense architecture and play a role in multilateral security 
cooperation, Japan’s core strategy has been to strengthen the U.S. – Japan 
alliance and enhance cooperation with the United States. This strategy is 
deterrence against any breach of peace in the region by China or North Korea, 
and also a protection against the emergence of Chinese hegemony in the region 
threatening Japan’s national security. 
The Taiwan issue has already emerged as a prominent factor in the 
post-Cold War triangular relationship between China, Japan, and Taiwan. In 
this triangular relationship, the Taiwan issue involves the mutual interaction 
between different historical, political, economic, and security factors. In 
addition, the legal status of the Taiwan issue has altered with the changing 
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situation in the Asia-Pacific and the fluctuating power of the United States, 
Japan, and China, affecting the future of the island. 
In terms of cross-Strait relations, Japan’s position that it is a problem 
for the “Chinese” to resolve has always been clear. However, Japan does not 
fully agree that the Taiwan issue is simply a matter of the internal politics of 
China. Japan argues that if mainland China and Taiwan are unable to peacefully 
resolve the Taiwan issue, this will have international implications. If cross-
Strait conflict threatens peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan 
may dispatch Self-Defense Forces to assist military action by U.S. forces in 
accordance with the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty in order to maintain regional 
stability and Japan’s national security.16
In 1997 the United States and Japan signed new Guidelines for U.S. – 
Japan Defense Cooperation. The most significant feature of this agreement was 
that in the case of situations in the areas surrounding Japan that have a material 
effect on Japan’s peace and security, Japan should quickly adopt appropriate 
response measures.  In order to implement the new Guidelines for U.S. – Japan 
Defense Cooperation, the Diet passed three related laws, including the Law on 
Emergencies in Areas Surrounding Japan, “specifically defining” security in 
the Taiwan Strait as part of the U.S. – Japan security system. 
In Taiwan, the “Japan Working Group” (now known as the “Board 
on Taiwan-Japan Relations”) was established under the Presidential Office in 
2001. The Working Group was tasked with reviewing important policy with 
regard to the relationship with Japan. In addition, in 2005, while maintaining 
the existing Association of East Asia Relations, the “Committee on Japanese 
Affairs” was also established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible 
for the operation of relations with Japan from within the system. In the same 
year, the director of the Political Warfare Bureau Hu Chen-pu became the first 
general from Taiwan to visit Japan. The aim of Hu’s visit was to study issues 
surrounding Taiwan-Japan regional security, demonstrating the increasing 
frequency of military exchanges between the two sides. 
Moreover, in August the same year, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) headquarters published the “Proposition on Taiwan’s Relations with 
Japan,” emphasizing “Taiwan’s subjectivity” and “avoiding thinking based on 
Chinese feudalism,” “reestablishing the historical memory of Taiwan-Japan 
relations.” The main point was that while Taiwan was at odds with China, it 
has a “shared liberal democratic outlook” with Japan, emphasizing that for 
Taiwan, the importance of Japan was second only to the United States. Taiwan 
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therefore regarded Japan as a “potential strategic partner,” and proposed 
concrete objectives for the future development of Taiwan-Japan relations: 
1. Creating a framework for peace in East Asia based on shared values of 
“freedom, democracy, and human rights” between Taiwan and Japan. 2. 
Reverse the restrictions in contacts between the governments of Taiwan and 
Japan after the break in diplomatic relations of 1972, and enhance the level of 
communication between the two sides. 
Following this announcement, Presidential Office Secretary-General 
Mark Chen, DPP Chair Yu Shyi-kun, and former head of the DPP Department 
of International Affairs Hsiao Bi-khim led a delegation to Japan. Subsequently 
the President of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-pyng and Kuomintang (KMT) 
Chair Ma Ying-jeou also visited Japan. In addition, visits were not limited 
to senior figures. During the same period, Japan’s LDP organized a series of 
visits to Taiwan under the name “Japan-Taiwan Young Legislators’ Alliance,” 
showing an expansion in the levels of exchanges. As a result, President Chen 
Shui-bian proclaimed that relations between Taiwan and Japan were “the best 
for thirty years.”
After Shinzo Abe returned to the office of prime minister by defeating 
the Democratic Party in 2012, his foreign policy aimed to correct the imbalance 
in the alliance between Japan and the United States, and enable Japan to play 
a more proactive role in foreign relations and regional strategy. Abe’s primary 
strategy was to accelerate defense reform following the Japanese upper house 
elections, strengthening national defense and making collective self-defense 
with the U.S. constitutionally permissible. In addition, Abe applied a “bird's 
eye” approach to foreign policy to bring Japan into the international arena, 
deepening the reliance of the United States on Japan.17
On October 3, 2013, the United States and Japan convened the 2+2 
talks in Tokyo, publishing the document “Toward a More Robust Alliance and 
Greater Shared Responsibilities.” The document stated that the U.S. – Japan 
alliance would continue to promote regional security, and encouraged China 
to adhere to international norms of behavior and improve transparency in its 
military.18 Aside from strengthening cooperation between the U.S. military and 
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, the document also included the exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense. More importantly, it responded to China’s 
rapid expanding military force. 
Since the signing of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty in 1951, 
although China had attempted to let the United States and Japan change its 
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geographic coverage to be applied, it has failed to explicitly exclude Taiwan. 
Therefore, Japan’s balancing act with Taiwan that is directed vis-à-vis China 
has not altered. As long as this continues in the future, this is the best possible 
outcome for Taiwan. 
Conclusion
The effective U.S. – Japan alliace helps the United States maintain a leading role 
in Asia-Pacific security, given that its Asia-Pacific strategy is anchored on the 
alliance. Therefore, despite being a legacy of the Cold War confrontation, the 
alliance has continued therefore. The role of the U.S. – Japan security system 
in Asia-Pacific regional security has become increasingly important. In 1997, 
the new Guidelines for U.S. – Japan Defense Cooperation were implemented. 
Aside from affirming the continued American national interest in the region, 
the new Guideless also highlighted the competition between China, the United 
States, and Japan as the three major powers in the region. 
Objectively speaking, Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait occupy an 
important geopolitical position in the West Pacific. However, their actual 
strategic value is determined by the overall international environment. As the 
international environment changes, so does the strategic value of Taiwan. 
In the 1990s, the international system entered the so-called post-
Cold War period. In military terms, the value of China in the containment 
strategy against the Soviet Union dropped significantly. In addition, as a 
result of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, many Western strategists began to see 
a powerful China as a security threat to Asia, or even to the world. In this 
uneasy atmosphere, Taiwan’s status as a geopolitical hub became increasingly 
prominent. 
As the security environment in the Asia-Pacific changed, Taiwan’s 
strategic importance has been highlighted again, playing an important part in 
the joint U.S. – Japan defense against the potential threat from China, benefiting 
Taiwan’s security environment. Therefore, the incorporation of Taiwan into 
the scope of the Security Treaty should be seen positively. In addition, cross-
Strait relations have not been insulated from the Guidelines for U.S. – Japan 
Defense Cooperation. They have also clearly acted as a considerable constraint 
on China, otherwise Beijing would not be so concerned about the expansion of 
the scope of the treaty. In a triangular relationship, two sides together must be 
larger than the third side. Within this framework, China will not act hastily to 
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solve the Taiwan issue. 
Moreover, during his second term as prime minister, in addition to 
maintaining a close alliance with the United States, Shinzo Abe has actively 
pursued to revise the Constitution, with a major focus on Article 9, in order 
to authorize the roles and missions of the Self-Defense Forces for collective 
self-defense, placing special emphasis on security issues and “normalization” 
of Japan’s international status. At the same time, Taiwan-Japan relations 
have continued to develop based on common values in continuation from the 
Koizumi era. Both the signing of FTA agreements and high-level visits are 
beneficial for shaking off China’s constraints. In addition, Abe has clearly hold 
the view that in Japan’s effort to develop friendly relations with its neighbors 
in the Asia-Pacific, Taiwan counts. In the Asia-Pacific region, both Taiwan and 
Japan face similar political and economic contradictions when dealing with 
China, and have similar foreign relations with the United States. The continued 
development of bilateral relations can help avoid unbalanced development in 
the Asia-Pacific region and consolidate security in the Taiwan Strait. 
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